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Abstract

The purpose of conducting this study is to identify the nature of the relationship

between income inequality and taxation by correlating the taxes and their observed
impact on the Gini coefficient. It is hypothesized that the greater tax rates result in greater
impact on the Gini coefficient — the independent variable, also called redistribution. Data
is run through a regression analysis to determine the strength of the hypothesis. A
positive relationship between redistribution and the level of taxation is determined to

exist. It is also found that fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by the level of taxation,
not by its structure. While this study cannot weigh in on what the “proper” role of the
state in the economy ought to be, it does demonstrate that a larger state presence brings
about a more equal society. Furthermore, it cannot confirm that more state intervention
among those who are more capable of paying (higher-income earners) plays any
significant role in altering inequality.
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Introduction

In 1936 John Maynard Keynes - one of the most influential economists of the 20"
century — said, “It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank balances than over

his fellow citizens” (Keynes, 1936). Rather than allowing such great inequality to arise
that a man is able to “tyrannize” over his fellow citizens, government ought to step into

the market to prevent these “tyrannical” extremes of inequality and to limit man’s

tyranny to the constraints of his own bank account. Keynes is implicitly advocating the
existence of a government role in the economy with the intention of restricting extreme
inequality, through measures not yet stated here. Keynes’ other works detail various
models of market-intervention empowering the government to reduce inequality — the
relevant one, for the purpose of this study at least, being taxation.
State intervention in the market and especially the state’s role in taxation for the
purpose of reducing inequality remains a controversial issue that has pervaded political
discussion in the United States for decades. Beginning with today’s President Barack
Obama and going backwards in time (George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush,
Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, etc.) a pattern emerges that reflects not only the
alternating political identity of the American population, but demonstrates an oscillating

volition for government intervention in the economy swinging between the Right and the
Left over time like a pendulum.

Income equality is an a high-priority, heated issue today, discussed in the media
on a daily basis. In a recent article discussing President Obama’s struggle to combat
inequality, Derek Thompson senior editor of The Aflantic stated “Income inequality is an
obvious phenomenon. But its effects are not obvious, and its cure even less so”
(Thompson, 2010). Thompson addresses a truth increasingly exposed due to globalization
and technology: in our modern world there exists, sometimes side-by-side, both extreme
wealth and devastating poverty. In Mexico, for example, wealth is almost entirely
concentrated in the extremes: “... the average income received by the population’s
poorest 10 percent is under 2 percent, while the wealthiest 10 percent receives 40 percent
of national income. Amazing, isn’t it?” (Guzman, 2006). The harsh nature of such
inequality often prefers a tendency for some redistribution. If inequality is caused by the
uneven distribution of skills and resources, redistribution seeks to target the lowest
extreme of the range of inequality within a society, so that it might be able to alleviate the
conditions of its socioeconomic status and catalyze the creation ofa more equal society.
Various efforts seek to remediate the crushing effects of inequality through the
redistribution of skills, filling in the “gaps” not previously addressed by government aid.
Funds generated by income tax can be funneled towards social welfare programs that,
targeting the lowest sector within the existing range of inequality, ought to help remediate
severe extremity (MaCurdy et. al, 2008). These efforts and programs come in many
forms and work on many different scales, whether they are government social welfare
programs, NGOs, charity organizations, need-based scholarship funds, or local churches
volunteering within the community. Examples of such efforts include the Red Cross,
unemployment benefits in the American social welfare system, Medicare, Medicaid, the

Pell Grant for needy university students, and even local soup kitchens. While such efforts
are undeniably generous and sing praises to the good intentions of some individuals, it is
often believed that when inequality within a society exists to a very large extent the only
force properly scaled to be efficacious in extension and in profundity is the state. One of
the most common manners in which the state seeks to alter inequality is through taxation.
Taxation is hardly ever more controversial or contested than when increased tax
rates are implemented for the purpose of creating “social or economic justice” or
“fighting poverty” or “reducing inequality.” This is especially apparent in the moralbased tax debate in the United States political realm, where for decades the political
ideology and corresponding economic strategies have continuously swinging oscillated
between the Right and the Left, the shifting political alliance of the party in the executive
office reflecting this trend. As the global economic market faces continued economic
stagnation, indignant politicians advocate differing policies concerning the “right amount
of taxes” that will effect economic growth in today’s precarious market.
While backing their opinions with those of the “classical” economists and
founders of economic theories — such as Keynes, von Mises, Kalecki, and Hayek —
mainstream, modern media-moguls ground the basis for their viewpoints on taxation in
value-laden beliefs, such as nationalism, patriotism, and protection from overreaching

government.

For example, Glenn Beck — a current well-known, right-wing politician and

outspoken advocate against President Obama’s economic policies favoring redistribution
— recently stated that any effort towards social justice is really the “forced redistribution
of wealth with a hostility toward individual property rights, under the guise of charity
and/or justice”(Beck, 2010).

The point is that any discussion on taxes cannot be a purely

‘

“empirical” or

“objective” commentary but, rather, carries with it implications and bias concerning the
role of the government in the economy. The state (or government) is inherently linked to
the issue of taxation, constituting the force capable of creating legislation altering taxes in
an economy with some degree of freedom. Countries like Norway or Sweden, which
display large welfare states and relatively “equal” societies, serve as verifiable examples
demonstrating the beneficial nature of a profound government role in the market.

Thus,

any discussion of taxes is actually discussion pertaining to the role of government
concerning taxes — as is clearly seen by recent political rhetoric concerning taxation in the
United States.
The relationship between taxation and inequality is particularly relevant in the
modern context — as the rich, developed democracies of the World become yet richer and
more developed, inequality remaining in countries left behind from this trend becomes
more exposed and can characterize these countries as “need-to-fix” areas, the “fixing” of

which is often funded by taxes. Identifying how taxation and inequality correlate to one
another would give conclusion to the ceaseless debate on the role of the state in the
economy and would give direction to states seeking to remediate situations of extreme
inequality existing within societies. If there exists a positive relationship between taxation
and inequality, then an argument against increased taxes could be made (as higher taxes
would suggest higher inequality); however, if a negative relationship is concluded
between taxation and inequality, perhaps governments will finally have solid evidence to
justify more intervention in the market for the purpose of reducing inequality. What is the
correlation between income inequality and taxation?

Research Question and Rationale
Social conditions correlated with income inequality make desirable redistribution,
at least to some extent. Inequality is highly correlated with crime rates. In a 2001 study
among U.S. States and Canadian Provinces, a tenfold difference in homicide rates related
to inequality was determined. Differences in inequality in each state/province accounted
for roughly half of the variation in homicide rates (Daly et al., 2001). A similar
relationship was found to exist when examining worldwide homicide and inequality rates
(Fajnzylber et al., 2002). According to a 1999 study, “Economic inequality is positively

and significantly related to rates of homicide despite an extensive list of conceptually
relevant controls. The fact that this relationship is found with the most recent data and
using a different measure of economic inequality from previous research, suggests that
the finding is very robust” (Lee, 2001).
Unequal distribution of wealth is also linked to social capital, as
established by Robert Putnam, Harvard professor of political science (Putnam, 1993)
Putnam established a positive relationship between trust within a society and higher
levels of equality. Using the United States and Italy as case studies, the findings are as
follows: “Social capital and economic inequality moved in tandem through most of the
twentieth century. In terms of the distribution of wealth and income, America in the
1950s and 1960s was more egalitarian than it had been in more than a century... Those
decades were also the high point of social connectedness and civic engagement. Record
highs in equality and social capital coincided. Conversely, the last third of the twentieth

century was a time of growing inequality and eroding social capital... The timing of the

two trends is striking: somewhere around 1965-1970 America reversed course and started

becoming both less just economically and less well-connected socially and politically”
(Putnam, 2000).

Due to the nature of the social conditions accompanying inequality, governments
often seek to alter inequality to some degree. Where there exists a society characterized
by the concentration of wealth within a very small sector, the government can seek to
remediate inequality by implementing social welfare programs. Such programs are often
funded in large part by taxes and target the lowest extreme within the range of inequality
within society.
The programs stemming from inequality-altering efforts result in the creation or
expansion of a welfare state. Theoretically, the sector of society having the lowest
incomes benefits from welfare programs and gains means through which self-elevation of
socioeconomic status becomes possible, resulting in reduced inequality. The process is as
follows: inequality in society generates pressure for redistribution on the government, the
government raises taxes, these taxes fund social welfare programs, and the welfare
programs target certain sectors of society and subsequently alter inequality. Thus, there
ought to exist some kind of link - a relationship - between taxation and inequality. The
purpose of conducting this study is to identify the nature of this relationship. What is the
correlation between income inequality and taxation?

Theoretical Framework

Inequality
I choose to focus solely on the inequality of income because the sector of
inequality measured by income offers the most empirical data. While wealth,
consumption, level of satisfaction, and many other proxies for well-being can also be
used to measure inequality, the lack of current and consistent data reflecting these

measures makes preferent) Figure 1-3: Vicious Cycle of Market Performance
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measure inequality througn well-being, the airrerences across countries 1n vetiefs about
the nature of inequality do not reflect reality. Beliefs about inequality reflect, rather than
reality, the efficacy of the indoctrination and formation of beliefs exercised through the
political power of the left and right. Education is a key environment in which such
indoctrination takes place. Beliefs are highly malleable and susceptible to external
influence and, therefore, cannot be used as objective evidence to describe a general trend.
Relying on empirical work, inequality — for the purpose of this study, at least — is best
measured by the inequality of annual income.
In order to measure income inequality, the distribution of income must be
transformed into a single measure that can be used in standard empirical work. The Gini
coefficient is the most widely-used and universally-recognized measure of income

inequality (Glaeser, 2006). Although many other measures of income inequality exist (for
example, what share of total wealth is owned by the richest 5% of a population, which
perhaps would give a clearer picture of why inequality has occurred), any empirical
measures of income inequality within this study indicate use of the Gini coefficient.

Inequality over time
In discussing the appearance of and the increase in its presence, there exist
various scholarly explanations outlining theories of income inequality. One such theory
emphasizes the changing nature of inequality as a result of time. Perhaps the best
reflection of this theory is the Kuznets curve, illustrated in Figure I-1, which

demonstrates how income inequality in countries initially increases and then decreases as

Inequatity

countries become richer or more developed over time.

Income pet Capils

Figure I-1: Kuznets Curve

This curve is both an economic phenomenon and a reflection of political factors.
Countries in the early stages of industrialization generally follow a trend of few public
efforts to redistribute wealth; inequality declines with development over time as
governments are able to take a more active role in redistribution as industrialization
proceeds. The U.S. provides an interesting counterexample to this theory, having
experienced a striking increase in inequality in recent years when compared to that of
most other comparably developed nations (Picketty et. al, 2003). There are three main
reasons development increases redistribution: due to increasing government competence,
development is associated with greater government size; development is associated with

greater education and political skill on the part of its poorer citizens; development
generates a structured and readily-applied workforce from a previously dispersed and
unindustrialized one (Glaeser, 2006).

Inequality across countries
A major source of contention for scholarly explanation of income inequality
centers on inequality across countries. Looking at one country as a whole, the more
compact the distribution of skills and resources is, less inequality results. To demonstrate
that the inequality of skills and resources across countries causes inequality of income
across countries, scholars point to the distribution of skills in developed versus
undeveloped states. In egalitarian countries, such as those of Scandinavia, the distribution
of skills and resources is quite compact; in countries still developing, like Brazil, the
distribution of skill and resources levels is rather heterogeneous between the educated
elite sectors of society and those compromised of mostly uneducated workers. The
income inequality reflects the variance in these levels of skills and resources distributed —
that of Scandinavia is much lower than that of Brazil (Glaeser, 2006).
In inequality in the distribution of skills and resources underlies income inequality
across countries the task at hand, then, remains to ascertain why skill and resource

inequalities are so different across countries. Explanations that allude to cultural and
religious causes and to the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and income
inequality are some theories frequently cited to give reason to the occurrence of differing
skill and resource inequalities across countries. Another explanation of this phenomenon
perhaps more relevant for this study, however, credits the large number of government
policies (or lack thereof) towards schooling and redistribution as a high-impact factor

effecting the distribution of income. There exists a strong negative correlation between

inequality and social welfare spending (also referred to as redistributive policies) across
countries, suggesting that spending on social welfare programs reduces inequality. Thus,

governments have power to reform income inequality by altering income distribution
through tax policy and spending. The implications of such policies (for example, taxation
policies) on income inequality will be examined in further research (Glaeser, 2006).

If governments can, and often do, exercise power to alter income distribution,
they must have motives for doing so. Governments must decide to what extent they wish
to invest in redistribution, each government individually influenced by traits or trends
specific to its population. Ethnic and racial fractionalization provides an example of a
factor tending to limit the redistribution of income. A more heterogeneous society often
results in a “protectionist” tendency urging people to “look out for their interests” — those
pertaining to their particular classification of society. This is often seen in areas of high
racial and wealth conflict, where one demographic may vote against redistributive
policies because they prefer not to have their earned income benefit the “other”
demographic (Luttmer, 2001). In a more homogenous society, people are less inclined to
identify themselves with one particular sector of society but, rather, as belonging to that
society as a whole; therefore, they are more willing to share goods and more inclined to

favor redistributive policies. Redistribution across countries declines with ethnic
heterogeneity (Alesina et. al, 2004). Other deciding factors influencing to what extent a
government invests in redistribution include, but are not limited to, federalism,

democracy, growth, financial crisis, industrialization, land distribution, initial inequality,
and income inequality itself.
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Preferences
for the role and size of government
The Meltzer-Richard Model was created in an effort to explain how income

distribution affects the choice of tax policy in a state-voting model. Allan Meltzer and
Scott Richard concluded that demand for redistribution decreases with income. The
median voter’s preferred level of redistribution increases with the level of inequality.
According to the standard political economy model of redistribution, an increase in
inequality should lead to higher public demand for redistribution and, ultimately, more
redistribution. The size of the government, measured by the share of income
redistributed, is determined by voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends

on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. In other words,
when the median voter’s income becomes more “unequal” (lower than the mean income)
there is more preference for redistribution and, as it is determined through majority vote,
more government (Meltzer et. al, 1981).

The role of government in inequality
In this study I seek to explain income inequality across countries, which has
already been stated as stemming from inequality in the distribution of skills. To remediate
inequality, the government can invest in the distribution of skills. What role, then, should
the government take in the economy where redistributary policies are concerned?

What

do schools of thought pertaining to the governmental role in the economy have to
contribute to discussion of redistributive policy and income inequality?
Competing theories explaining the preferable roles the government is capable of
pursuing to remediate income inequality through the alteration of income distribution
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must first be given a setting - the parameters within which they operate. The
corresponding schools of thought to follow refer specifically to their application within
the free market in a democracy. A free market is that which has no economic government
intervention or regulation beyond the measures taken to secure and ensure the execution
of contracts and private ownership, traditionally also known as liberalism. Ideally, any
regulation is limited to the players within the economy. In a free market economic
system, the principle of competition is not debated; however, its outcome is. Competition

typically leads to disparity in the distribution of economic goods.

Often governments

seek to alleviate the negative impacts caused by this disparity affecting those who are
least-advantaged in society. Different theories seek to address this product of competition
and the role the government ought to have in defining and distributing economic equality.

CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Identifying the nature of the relationship between income inequality and taxation
will be concluded from the observation of data given by real-world application of taxes
and the implementation of skills-distribution policy and programs in various case
selections. The data collected by the research design is then analyzed in an attempt to
formulate a general theory or establish a general trend identifying how inequality and
taxation are correlated. I run regression analysis on economic data available for countries
all over the world to determine if there is a significant correlation between any of the
independent variables and income inequality.
The strength of my hypothesis will be tried by observations drawn from data
pertaining to OECD countries. Postulating the efficacy of taxation necessitates the
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presence and/or possibility of change in government policy and the observation of the
resulting fluctuations in the economy and in society, as not completely controlled by the

government. For this reason, the selection process is constrained by the need for a certain
degree of economic freedom. Furthermore, the availability of data is limited —
documentation is different or lacking from different databases. Thus, limiting the cases to
OECD countries provides comparable and sufficient data.
Sources of information, especially datasets, used in this study include SEDLAC
(CEDLAS

and the World Bank Group), the World Bank Group, the U.S. Census Bureau,

the Luxembourg Income Study database (LIS), the CIA World Factbook, OECD
Statistics, Heritage Foundation, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S.

Department of Commerce (especially the Bureau of Economic Analysis).
First, the existing body of literature is examined to gain a general understanding
of the way in which taxation targets inequality. Then some of the cases and their
economic trends are observed in order to extrapolate which variables will be used to
determine if there exists correlation between taxation and income inequality. Finally, the
data is run through a regression analysis to determine the strength of the hypothesis.

Outline

Chapter 2 is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the two competing schools of
thought relevant to the topic of the role of the government in the market — the Keynesian
and neoclassical models.

I define the key concepts associated in each school of thought,

give name to the principle contributors of each, and provide application of the theories to
the research question.
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Chapter 3 provides discussion of the methodology. The research design is

outlined and variables are defined.
In Chapter 4 I state the results of the analysis and draw conclusions from the
output of the research design.

I check for relationships between dependent and

independent variables that are consistent with my hypothesis, and form a conclusion from
the results. I discuss the limitations of my research and the implications it may carry. I

give an account of how I overcome these obstacles to produce a credible answer to the
research question, and close by mentioning any implications for future research
pertaining to the topic in light of my findings.

14

CHAPTER 2
Key Concepts
In order to conduct concise and thorough research, the various concepts addressed
and applied in studying the correlation between income inequality and total tax wedge
must be defined and expanded. Essentially, I argue that there is a negative relationship

between taxation and income inequality. I hypothesize that income inequality (dependent
variable) is inversely driven by taxation (independent variable) — if government increases
taxes and spends them on social programs, income inequality ought to decrease.

The role of income inequality in economic growth
From the school of classical political economics come several models of
economic growth in which inequality plays a role. The neoclassical growth model accepts
unemployment as a permanent feature of the economy and thereby mandates inequality.
If unemployment benefits remain below the wage level, people have an incentive to find
work rather than become dependent upon such benefits. Unemployment cannot be
lowered to zero and thus inequality must always exist, at least to some extent. Inequality
creates greater social stratification, effecting greater competition for status. Competition
drives capitalism. Thus, the neoclassical theory of economic growth ignores the
relationship between income distribution and growth for macroeconomic analysis
(Slomp, 2000).
15

Developed by Galor and Zeira, the credit market imperfection approach
demonstrates that inequality has a long-lasting detrimental effect on economic

development and capital formation in the presence of credit market imperfections (Galor
et al., 1993).
The political economy approach to economic growth, developed by Alesina and

Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), assigns a negative impact from
inequality on growth (Alesina et al., 1994) (Persson et al., 1994).
A 1996 study by Perotti confirmed the credit market imperfections approach and
refuted the political economy mechanism. The research examined the channels through
which inequality may affect economic growth as pertaining to the two models. The
association of inequality with lower levels of human capital formation — which is
associated with lower growth — was determined (in accordance with the credit market
imperfections model). Perotti also demonstrated that there is a correlation between
inequality and lower levels of taxation and lower levels of economic growth (Perotti,

1996).

Schools of thought
Perspectives on economic inequality

In the field of the political economy, the size of government — or the role of the
state in the market — is highly controversial. The polemic issue of taxation carries with it
implications concerning the “proper” amount of state market-intervention. While
empirical evidence results from studies that seek to support or refute such theories,
arguments concerning the size of government are founded on perspectives of what is
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“equitable.” What follows is a discussion on two broad perspectives concerning what is
the “proper” role of the state and the two general economic schools of thought to which
they (loosely) ascribe.
The modern political economy of the developed, Western world has its rights in
liberalism. A philosophy born from the opposition force to elitist theories such as the
Divine Right of Kings, absolute monarchy, nobility and the right of birthplace, lack of
social mobility, and established religion. Its birth known today as the Age of
Enlightenment, this powerful rebel force — largely spearheaded by John Locke — served
as justification for the overthrow of tyrannical rule in the American and French
Revolutions. John Locke promulgated concepts that spoke to the inherent equality of
citizens as human beings — that rulers are allowed to rule by the governed as so are
subject to the consent of the governed, that humans’ natural rights are protected by a
social contract that withholds the rule of law, and that every individual has a right to life,
liberty and property (Economist, 2006). Liberalism embodied a philosophy opposed to
older, more structural and hierarchical models that denied individuals social mobility but,
rather, gave privileges to those deemed worthy by their station of birth. Liberals believe
in equality and liberty and espouse principals such as freedom of religion,
constitutionalism, capitalism, human rights, and free and fair elections (Song, 2006)
(Wolin, 2004).

Following revolutions of independence, growth, urbanization and the beginnings
of industrialization, liberalism underwent some stratification. As the nineteenth century
became the twentieth, polarization between two ends of a spectrum regarding the proper

17

size of the government created two distinct groups of liberalists (Slomp, 2000): neoclassical liberalists (or monetarists) and social (or modern) liberalists (Donohue, 2003).

During the first half of the twentieth century, increased production capabilities
resulted in worldwide capitalist competition that left some as “winners” of this system
and some as the “losers.” State regulation had not caught up to such unprecedented
growth, arising to greater levels of inequality. There were those liberalists who believed
that the state ought to interfere in such processes to protect individuals from what they
saw as “inequitable exploitation.” Thus was born the philosophy of social liberalism — the
belief that liberalism should be coupled with social justice. Social liberalists believe that
individual freedom is harmonious with the good of the community. Social liberalism
espouses the view that the proper role of the state entails, at least to some extent, the
provision of protection from undue economic and social harm (De Ruggiero, 1959). Most
present-day western democracies adhere to an extent of social liberalism, as evidenced by
public goods and services such as free public education systems and unemployment
benefits (Fauks, 1999). In American politics, the Center or Center-Left is generally
associated with the philosophy of social liberalism.
In opposition to social liberalism, those who feared its “far-reaching” effects
pushed themselves towards the opposite end of the liberalist spectrum. Classical
liberalism advocates a minimal role of the state. The philosophy commits to the ideals of
individual liberties, rule of law, constitutionalism, laissez-faire economics (free markets),

due process, and limited government (Dickerson et al, 2009). Classical liberalism surged
as a state and policy response to growing trends of urbanization and the Industrial
Revolution, advocating progress and competition without constraint. Resurgence in the

18

classical liberal philosophy beginning in the late ig" century and driving into the 20"
century advocated a minimalist government — or, that the state be as small as possible.
Although the starting line of this revival of interest is not strictly defined, classical
liberalism developed into “neo-classical liberalism.” Contributors to neoclassical
liberalism include Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman
(Richardson, 2001). In the present day, “libertarianism” has also been used in association
with neo-classical liberalism — particularly in American politics, where both neo-classical
liberalists and right-libertarian strongly identify with conservative, “right-wing” ideology
especially as it pertains to minimalist market intervention (Ryan, 1995).

Social liberalism and Keynesian economics
Advocating consumption, rather than thrift, as promoting economic growth is the
Keynesian theory of tax incidence. This theory was founded on the works of John
Maynard Keynes, an infamous economist, advisor, civil servant, speculator, polemicist,
and journalist. He believed in and strongly advocated for the control of business booms
and busts through heavy-handed fiscal policy — mainly taxing, borrowing, and spending
(Posner, 2009). Echoing his reasoning, John Rawls gives insight into this theory of justice
in economic distribution.

Rawls states the first responsibility of the government is to

guarantee equal civil liberties for all citizens, as “the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original [government] (Rawls, 1970).” Created
for the purpose of their protection, the government should protect liberties.

Essential to

any society, liberties cannot be sacrificed in order to increase economic well-being.

Nor

can any individual’s civil liberties be sacrificed for the benefit of others — not even if “the

19

others” refers to the majority. In order to prevent the violation of the liberties of the leastadvantaged members of society, the state should distribute economic goods to maximize

these people’s advantage.

In this theory, Rawls permits inequality in the distribution of

economic goods; however, this inequality is only permissible if those having more goods
will promote the well-being of the least well-off members of society. In this manner, even

the most-disadvantaged members of society will have a tolerably decent life. “The
general conception of justice imposes no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are
permissible; it only requires that everyone’s position be improved (Rawls, 1970).”
Rawls argues that the circumstances of one’s birth — including individual talents,
social status, family influences, etc. — are matters of luck that should not unduly influence
peoples’ chances in life: “... no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural
fortune or social circumstances in the choice or principles (Rawls, 1970).” Thus, a central
task of morality is to constrain the detrimental effects of luck. Applied to a state in a free
market system, this theory permits inequality to exist, as it is a byproduct of liberty. The
government seeks to maintain a free market economic system that creates inequality
because to not do so would be to impede upon liberties. However, the government must
also protect some peoples’ liberties from being violated by the exertion of other’s
liberties. Only at this point, when the least-advantaged are become even less advantaged
— that is, their liberties are being stifled by others’ overexertion of their own — should the
government intervene in the distribution of economic justice. This can be done ina
variety of ways, such as through the use of welfare systems, social security, tariffs, trade
restrictions, currency control, and many more. Rawls argues that this theory of limited
government intervention is permissible only in the promotion of liberty and equal
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opportunity. “The distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of authority,
must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity
(Rawls, 1970).”
Nineteenth century political economist John Stuart Mill suggested the just

“distribution of wealth” include the possibility ofa social “taking” of wealth or income
from “some to be then disbursed to others considered to be more deserving.” Mill
conceives a link between production and distribution that encourages market devices,
such as income transfers from the more to the less affluent, as a form of social
intervention in the outcome of distribution. Public policy can correct actual distributional
outcomes rendered unsatisfactory by natural constraints. Government, then, has a task

(implying an obligation) to oversee the “fair” distribution of national income among the
various societal components of a population. The surplus of the privileged ought to be
expropriated by the government and distributed among the underprivileged (Gallaway et.

al, 2002).
In 1943 economist and business executive Jerome Levy wrote: “The working
class is the original and fundamental economic class... The function of the investing
class is to serve the members of the working class by insuring them against loss and by
providing them with desired goods.” He argued that the existence of the investing class is
Justified by the service it renders the working class — although the contrary (the working
class exists to serve the investing class) does not hold true. The investing class “insures”
the working class by providing wages and desired goods. However, “The working class
has the right to insure itself through organizations composed of its members or through
government, thereby eliminating the investing class.” Levy proposed taxing excessive
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profits away from industries — those taxes that could not be justified by an industry’s

productive risk. The tax would confiscate the excess profit. Production of goods and
services for the benefit of the consumers is the purpose of any economic system,
according to Levy. A believer of the merits of capitalism, Levy believed that the
decisions about what should be produced be left to consumers. Constituting the
fundamental class, workers have the right to insist that profits go only to those investors
“whose enterprises produced desired goods and services” (Levy, 2001).
Closely tied to the works of Keynes, twentieth century economist Michal Kalecki
advocated strict fiscal policies to protect the larger class of poor against the effects of the
class incomes of the wealthier by levying indirect taxes on non-essentials (McFarlane,
1971). Kalecki sought an ideal economy, one free from unemployment and economy,
which he believed to be chronic features of capitalism (Levy, 2001). According to
Kalecki, when a person or business saves less and borrows more, there is greater

incentive to investment. Therefore, excess capacity in a capitalist economy, although
inevitable, inhibits investment. In order to protect the lower range of income distribution
from bearing the burden of high investment, taxes should not be levied on lower income
groups or on necessities but, rather, direct taxes or indirect taxes on non-essentials should
be levied on high income groups to restrain consumer demand (McFarlane, 1971).
U.S. President Barack Obama has fashioned his administration’s economic
development strategies using a very Keynesian approach. In light of the upcoming 2012
presidential election, the economic policy of increasing government spending and
decreasing taxes has led to much discussion from economic and political perspectives.
Long-term problems such as “the inefficient tax code, the federal deficit, growing debt
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and the need for entitlement reform” have Americans concerned. As a consequence of the

recent economic recession President Obama has implemented “stimulus packages” —
bailouts of various types in the financial sector — that account for a very large portion of

the current astronomical 12% of GDP deficit (Scherer, 2011). A deficit of 7% of GDD up
to 2020 is predicted by the Congressional Budget Office (Alesina et. al, 2010). Many
Americans are expressing their concern about these numbers, preferring a more long-term
approach to economic strategy than short-term stimulus - reflected in the 2010 exit polls,
which found that voters considered reducing deficits a higher priority than spending
money to create jobs. Holding that government should increase spending in times of
economic hardship, this preference for the opposite is a rejection of Keynesian theories
on the part of the American voters. In fact, concern has grown so much that talk about

further deficit spending has become too risky for the government. President Obama is
proposing smaller initiatives and taking a more careful path, aiming to spur short-term
growth without being labeled a “Big Government big spender” by Republicans (Scherer,
2011). Clearly, being a Keynesian in these times has its stigmas.

Neoclassical liberalism and the neoclassical economic model
The neoclassical economic model is the major competing school of
thought to the Keynesian model. This theory was largely promoted by Friedrich Hayek,
an economist and political philosopher who warned against the intrusion of public law
into the area reserved for private law. Hayek was a minimal state theorist, viewing the
state as necessary in its classical function — the protective function. He defined the state
as the last instance of power against which there is no appeal to another instance.
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According to Hayek, “public goods” are those goods or services financed by taxes and

are indirect byproducts of the state. These goods require and legitimize taxes only when
deemed useful or necessary by those who have to finance them (Radnitzky, 2000).
Causing a dilemma of economic justice, Hayek states that these goods are compatible
with liberal principles so long as “the wants satisfied are collective wants of the
community as a whole (Hayek, 1978).” Coercion is central to the nature of governmental
taxes; public goods are paid for by taxpayers, many of whom are indifferent to or even
dislike the goods and serviced supplied by the state and financed by their incomes.
Redistribution takes place through public (tax-financed) goods and services (Radnitzky,

2000).
In his work entitled “The Entitlement Theory of Justice,” Robert Nozick relates to
this school of thought concerning the just distribution of wealth. Contrary to Rawls,
Nozick believes the job of morality is not to eliminate the detrimental effects of luck or,

in this case, to strive for any particular economic distribution. The state does not have the
right to distribute economic goods, those earned and owned by particular individuals.
For Nozick, the role of an economic theory of justice is simply to set down rules that
everyone should follow in acquiring and transferring those economic goods.

If goods are

acquired justly — that is, via transfer from someone who justly owned them — there is
nothing else the government need know or remediate. “A distribution is just if everyone
is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution [and]... if it arises from
another just distribution by legitimate means (Nozick, 1974).” Essentially, Nozick argues
that what makes distribution just is not its final outcome, but the rules followed in
determining its outcome. This parallels the arguments made by Hayek, who stated that
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taking from A by force to transfer to B is self-evidently unjust. Hayek found it

unacceptable that taxation should have redistribution as its avowed aim but claimed,
rather, that what mattered were the consequences, not the intentions, of welfare policies
(Hayek, 1960).
According to Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice, government interference in
economic distribution entails interference with individual liberty. He believes that

“patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other
persons... [which] gives them a property right in you (Nozick, 1974).” When the
government interferes in a free market system in order to alleviate the disparity in
economic distribution, it is essentially entitling certain members to have claims in others’
property that they justly and independently acquired. Nozick sees this as a direct
infringement of personal liberty. “End-state and most patterned principles of distributive
justice institute (partial) ownership by others of people and their actions and labor

(Nozick, 1974).”
Pertaining to this school of thought is the belief that all liberty is created equal.
Competition cannot and does not harm anyone, although there are undoubtedly losers in
competition.

Harm denotes intention. The losers are not harmed because they have not

been wronged by the winners of competition.

Thus, the unequal distribution of economic

goods generated by the competition of free market systems, being justly obtained, should
not be remediated though intervention that takes wealth from those who have committed
no wrong or harmful act in acquiring it (Nozick, 1974). Income inequality is harmful for
growth because it leads to policies that fail to protect property rights and fail to allow full
private appropriation of returns from investment (Persson et. al, 1994). Nozick argues
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that any government intervention that impairs competition in a free market economic

system is a violation of individual liberty and has negative impacts on both the economy
and the society (Nozick, 1974).

Other critics of redistribution argue that some government transfer programs lead
to greater inequality because high-income families receive a disproportionately large
percentage of the benefits (Perry et. al, 2006). This is usually the case when the
individual benefit is linked to the contribution wage, as is the case of contributory

programs like unemployment insurance and contributory pensions. Workers receiving a
higher wage are entitled to higher benefits and pensions (Forteza et. al, 2009).
Economist Alberto Alesina champions strategies that echo the ideals put forth by
Friedrich Hayek regarding the role of the state in the economy, especially as it pertains to
redistributary policies. Disputing the need for more government spending to encourage
economic growth, Alesina advocates spending cuts instead. Austerity calms bond
markets, lowering interest rates and subsequently promoting investment, thereby
triggering economic growth. Taxpayers are reassured by deficit-cutting that more fiscal
adjustments will not be necessary in the future, reviving their spirits and reviving
spending-habits. Taxpayer reassurance is essential for stimulating growth; failure to
reassure taxpayers could lead to a financial crisis brought on by fears of government
overindebtedness — possibly the greatest current risk to global growth (Coy, 2010).
Called by The Economist magazine as “the most influential economist of the
second half of the 20" century... possibly all of it ,” (Economist, 2006) renowned
economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman argued that free trade, lower taxes on

income and capital, and a reduction in the burden of regulation would increase economic
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growth and improve social well-being. He warned against the unintended negative
consequences of excessive government intervention in the economy. Having made

significant contributions to the University of Chicago tradition, his ideas serve as the
basis of mainstream economic policy in various parts of the world. Public policies
reflecting Friedman’s thinking have effected, to a large extent, the high standard of living
enjoyed by Canadians today. Friedman argued the necessary pre-condition of economic
freedom for political freedom to exist. Using the Economic Freedom of the Work Index,
of which he was a co-founder, Friedman demonstrated empirically that freer economies
tend to be more prosperous. Furthermore, societies that are economically freer tend to be

more politically free. Competitive capitalism is the economic organization that directly
provides economic freedom and subsequently, through its separation of economic power
from political power enabling one to offset the other, promotes political freedom.
According to Friedman, the fundamental basis for public policy should be the voluntary
choices of individuals, not government mandates, because “such a foundation has been
shown to produce better economic and social outcomes for people” (Skinner, 2010).
Ludwig von Mises contributes another view on the role of governmental
confiscatory activities by assessing their impact on levels of total output, arguing that
such activities not only constitute unjustifiable expropriation, but also result in decreased
levels of national productivity. According to Mises, products only come into existence
already as somebody’s property. Therefore, goods must first be confiscated if they are to
be distributed. However, any such confiscation and expropriation of private goods
violates the nature of capitalism, in which capital accumulation and investments rely
upon the expectation that no such expropriation will occur. Rather than saving capital
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only to have it later taken by expropriators, people will prefer to consume capital if they
cannot expect absence of expropriation. Plans that aim at implementing confiscatory
policy while maintaining the notion of private property commit this inherent error — such
a system encourages people to spend their capital rather than allowing it to accumulate

and be confiscated. A reduction in total production will result from “government efforts
taking income from the relatively affluent and redirecting it to those at the low end of the
income distribution” (Gallaway et. al, 2002).

Mises critiques this so-called “confiscatory

interventionism,” advocating its negative effect of government actions on the total level
of economic activity in an economic system in his work Human Action: a Treatise on
Economics: “The greater part of that portion of the higher incomes which is taxed away
would have been used for the accumulation of additional capital” (Mises, 1998).
Economic growth slows and losses mount without that capital. Some scholars believe that
this Misesian perception of confiscatory interventionism appropriately interprets and
gives reason to events in the American economy over the last few decades (Gallaway et.

al, 2002).

Application to Research Question
As it relates to income inequality and redistribution, I prefer the sentiments of
social liberalism. I hypothesize that if the government implements redistributive policy
(by raising taxes) in order to alter inequality, and that money (collected from taxation)
funds social welfare programs, then there ought to exist a negative relationship between
taxation and income inequality.
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Economic growth is positively correlated with equality, which creates incentive
for a society to become more egalitarian (Perotti, 1996). Because greater income

inequality slows growth, societies in which great inequality exists ought to see a greater
collective want for redistribution. This link is a positive relationship between inequality
and redistribution (Perotti, 1996) (Milanovic, 2000). Therefore, more unequal societies

will choose greater redistribution. This may be less apparent in authoritarian regimes,
where governments can decide to ignore the preferences of the poor. In free-market
democracies, however, the relationship between market-generated inequality and
redistribution should be more pronounced (Perotti, 1996) (Milanovic, 1996) (Alesina et.

al, 1994),
Because inequality and redistribution are positively linked, the internal
predictions of the fiscal policy approach entail that initial income inequality in a
democratic society will result in redistribution (taxation) which will, in turn, effect
economic growth (Perotti, 1996). Thus, a positive relationship between inequality and
taxes can be concluded. The more unequal income distribution is within a democratic
society, the more the median voter has to gain through government taxes and transfers,
and the more likely he/she is to vote for higher taxes and transfers. Therefore, more
unequal societies will should greater redistribution. Voting decisions are based on income
before government fiscal redistribution (factor income) (Milanovic, 2000). Greater social
transfers are associated with greater inequality in disposable income, empirically
concluded in Perotti’s 1996 study using data from 67 countries from all regions of the
world (Perotti, 1996).
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There seems to be little empirical data concluding a positive or negative
relationship between taxation and income inequality. Studies have shown the relationship

to be mixed, at best, and have focused more on the relationship between initial inequality
and growth and/or pressure for redistribution (Kula et. al, 2010) (Perotti, 1993) (Alesina
et. al, 1994) (Persson et. al, 1994). The wealthy in society must overconsume to a certain

extent as a means of “investing” in the market — that is, excess profits used to purchase

goods or services that are not essential is an “investment” in the market as money is put
back into it. If the wealthy fail to overconsume a sufficient amount (underoverconsumption), their funds are not reinvested in the market and, to counteract initial

inequality, the government must implement higher taxes to effect economic growth. If the
wealthy overconsume more than this necessary (over-overconsume), the government
must lower taxes to counter initial inequality, resulting in lower economic growth (Kula
et. al, 2010).

I hypothesize that the larger state intervention in the market, in accordance with
Keynesian economics, will demonstrate the existence of a negative relationship between
taxation and income inequality — increased redistribution via taxation ought to decrease
inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
Introduction
Using multiple regression analysis will allow the impact of each independent
variable on the dependent variable. Statistical analysis demonstrates the correlations
between the two sets of variables. This chapter explains each variable, what each variable
measures, how each variable is measured, and how all the variables are pieced together
into the research design model — which will illustrate from where the results derive.

Dependent Variable
Fiscal redistribution
In this study, income inequality is measured by the Gini-coefficient of income
inequality — also known as the Gini-index score. The Gini coefficient is the most widelyused and universally-recognized measure of income inequality (Glaeser, 2006). The
Gini-coefficient gives income inequality numerical value: ranging from a core of 0.0 which indicates a perfectly equal society - and a score of 1.0, indicating a perfectly
unequal society. The diminutiveness of its numerical value (always measuring between 0)
and 1) can limit the precision of the Gini-coefficient; for this reason it is often expressed
as if having been multiplied by 100. For example, a measure of 46.8 actually indicates the
Gini-coefficient 0.468. Because different measures may rank the same set of distributions
in different ways, Gini-coefficients measuring the same case within the same time frame
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may differ slightly between sources. The Gini-coefficient varies before versus after taxes
have been paid and transfers have been made, as the state uses these measures to achieve

amore desirable distribution of wealth. The efficacy of taxes in altering income
inequality is measured by fiscal redistribution — or, the reduction of inequality by
government action.

(“Measuring inequality,” 2011).

Independent Variables
Gross domestic product per capita
It would be difficult to draw conclusions from a comparison of aggregate
economic factors given the variance between contributing aspects, such as geographical
size of an economy, population and labor force size, resource availability, infrastructure,
the standard of living, etc. For this reason, most of the analysis relies on per capita or

percentage comparisons.
The GDP is defined as the value of all final goods and services provided within
the geographical constraints of a nation in a given year. The GDP does not take into
account intermediary products, only finished goods and services. It also produces no
measure of where the capital used to purchase goods and serves will go — or, what
country will be made wealthier by that production. It offers only an indication of the size
of a domestic production economy. GDP can vary wildly — the highest GDP value in
2011 (and in this study) is that of the U.S., valuing $15.06 trillion, and the lowest
belonging to Iceland, at $14.1 billion in 2011 (CIA World Factbook).
The GDP values provided have been computed at official exchange rate (OER) to
allow for a comparison of purchasing power and economic presence in the international
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marketplace. “A nation’s GDP at OER is the home-currency denominated annual GDP
figure divided by the bilateral average U.S. exchange rate with that country in that year.”

All of the cases used in this study measure GDP using the home-currency GDP for 2011
and the average U.S. exchange rate for 2011, for the purposes of precision and of

consistency. The GDP per capita is the GDP divided by a country’s population in that
given year. Theoretically, it ought to express the level of product per person in a country
per given year if that wealth were distributed in a perfectly equal manner.
Overall tax burden
Overall tax burden measures the size of the tax system in a state by calculating the

percent of the GDP comprised of tax revenue.
Total tax wedge
Comparing tax rates can be tricky, as methods and rates vary widely from country
to country and even within one country. In this study, taxation is measured by the total
tax wedge. The total tax wedge is the percentage of gross earning given up in tax,
including any social security contributions. It can be calculated for a single worker, a
worker with the average number of dependents, or for a worker earning above, below, or
on par with the average wage of any given country. Here, total tax wedge is calculated for
a single worker without children, earning 100% of the average wage in a given year
(Nation Master, 2001).

To provide an example, in 2010 the average wage earned by a single worker in
Canada was US$43,692. Taxes paid to the central government amounted to 10.6%, 4.3%
to the sub-central government, and 7.3% as employee social security contributions. The
total tax wedge is the sum of all these percentages — 22.2%. Thus, if a single worker in
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Canada earned the average wage, roughly $9,700 of his earning would be extracted as
taxes, leaving him $33,392 to use as disposable income. Measuring the family total tax

wedge rather than the single total tax wedge is unnecessary, as an OECD comparison of
total wedge by family type for the year 2010 indicates the largest discrepancy between
the family and single tax wedge of one country is a difference 3.3% (OECD, 2010).

Population density

Population density is included as an independent variable because theoretically, a
country must use many more resources to provide public services (such as roads) if a

population is much more spread out. Some portion of government spending must be spent
on developing and maintaining infrastructure. The variable is expressed as a number
representing the number of square kilometers (World Factbook, 2012).
Unemployment rate
The unemployment rate is the percent of the labor force (age 15+) desirable of
working but unable to find employment. It can greatly effect inequality as unemployed
persons do not produce income for their state and usually receive (state-funded) benefits.
Capital formation
Capital formation expresses what percent of GDP was used as investment for
building capital to increase future efficiency and development. I predict that capital
formation and redistribution will have a negative relationship because money spent on
building capital is given at the opportunity cost of public services or benefits.
Social security contribution
Social security contribution measures what percent of the GDP was collected as
social security payments.
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CHAPTER 4
Income Inequality: Drivers

The state drives redistribution through institutions, regulations, and policy. For
example, states can provide free, public education. This increases human capital by
increasing the supply of skilled labor which decreased inequality due to education
differentials (when higher-income jobs require a higher level of education). A minimum-

2011 Gini Coefficients Before and After Taxes and Transfers for OECD Countries
2011 Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers
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Figure IV:1 2011 Fiscal Redistribution

wage level is another state mechanism that drives redistribution by raising the income of
the poorest worker (OECD, 2011). Figure [V:1 demonstrates the role of the state in
altering inequality in the year 2011, measured by fiscal redistribution. The reasons for
changes in the redistributive effectiveness of tax/transfer systems and the impact of
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public provided services are controversial as they must answer to the question of what the

proper size and role of the government should be in the market.
Across OECD countries, the state was able to reduce inequality by an average of
one quarter, with the larger effect in the Nordic countries and the smaller in Chile,
Mexico, Iceland, Turkey, and the United States (OECD, 2011). With the interests of this

study in mind, I compare some of the lower and higher rates of redistribution with their
corresponding total tax wedge, as shown in Figure IV-2.

® Redistribution Effect on 2010 Gini Coefficient
60

5

™ Taxes on the Average Worker 2010

-

50~
40

-

30

~

20

10

é

oe

o>&

o

49

x&

>

xQ

©

Figure IV-2: Redistribution effect and taxes
Source: OECD (2011), Taxing Wages; OECD.Stat

From simply looking at the data, there does appear to be some correlation between fiscal
redistribution and taxation — but, to what effect?
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Taxes: structure or size?
The revenues collected from taxes are channeled into social security funds, cash
transfer benefits, and public social services that drive redistribution (OECD, 2011). This
seems simple in theory — that taxes drive redistribution — but begs the question of what

about taxes drives redistribution. Taxation varies greatly from country to country. Tax
systems vary in their structure and in their size. In OECD countries, the largest
component of the tax structure is the income tax (OECD, 2011). Income tax rates in
different countries differ structurally in terms of their progressivity. A tax that is

progressive will see an increase in its rate as the taxable base amount increase
(Sommerfeld et al., 1992). As an example of the variance in the size of tax systems,
48.1% of Sweden’s GDP in 2010 was comprised of tax revenue while in Korea the tax
contribution to GDP came out to 23.3% (World Bank, indicator). Solving this puzzle has
serious implications for policymakers and tax systems around the world. If a country

hopes to achieve greater equality through more effective redistribution, what should it
choose to alter — the structure or the size of its tax system?
The argument for structure
Flat tax rates take an equal percentage of income from all taxpayers. Before the
government puts the revenues towards transfers, equality has not improved — wealth is
still distributed in the same way, meaning that citizens are in the same relative position to
one another in terms of how much wealth they hold. Redistribution then occurs when tax
revenues are allocated to social security funds, cash transfers, and public social services.
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Contrarily, if an income tax is progressive, those taxpayers falling within the highest tax
bracket will pay a larger percentage of their income in taxes than will those in lower tax

brackets. This directly takes from the highest extreme within the range of distribution.
Even before the government allocates tax revenues, the level of inequality has been
altered and redistribution has taken place. The impact of redistribution is then fomented

through the allocation of revenues to social security funds, cash transfers, and public
social services.
In theory there exists a positive relationship between the progressivity of the tax
system and the impact of taxes on driving redistribution. The steeper the progressivity of

the income tax, the more equal distribution of income across the board. The argument for
structural progressivity of tax systems and its role in mitigating or exacerbating wealth
inequality, however, is highly debatable.

For example, American economist and

politician Paul Ryan claims that tax policy has created a chasm of wealth between the
class-structure in America. On the other hand, economists Paul Krugman, Peter Orszag,

and Emmanuel Saez have argued that post World War II tax policy has enabled the
wealthiest Americans greater access to capital than their lower-income counterparts,
increasing income inequality (Saez et al, 2003).
Evidence
To test empirically the strength of each argument, I run a regression analysis of
three models. The first models contains only control variables (those that will be included
in each model and do not correspond directly with the system of taxation size-versus-

structure argument) — the unemployment rate, GDP per capita, capital formation, and
population density (Note, however, that population density was dropped after the first

39

:

model as

ad no impact and would h ave decreas

h

d the number of observations in the

of the tax system
followin’ models). The second model tests the notion that is the size
that drives redistribution. In addition to the control variables, it includes the total tax
wel. the overall tax burden, the social security
contribution rate (because this js
generally not progressive, but a flat rate tax),
and the social benefits budget size. The
third model tests for the structure of the tax system by including variables that measure

population targeting of benefits and progressive taxation — public sector redistribution
from taxes (indexed for progressivity), public sector redistribution from transfers

(indexed for progressivity), and the targeting efficiency of social benefits, The results are

IV-l.
summarized in Table
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Table [V-1: Determining size or structure as drivers of fiscal redistribution
Model

1

Tax System Size

Tax System
Structure

Unemployment rate
GDP per capita

Control Variables
003
(.002)

O01
(.001)

-2.63e-09

-2.80-07

(8.33e¢-07)

(4.05¢-07)

Population density

000

003
(.002)
1.70e-07

(7.77e-07)

-

-

-.002

-.003*

-.001

(.002)

(.001)

(.002)

(.000)

Capital formation

Independent
Variables

Total tax wedge

-

Overall tax burden

-

O02***

-

(.000)
.O01*
(.000)

Social security contribution

-

000
(.000)

Social benefits budget size

-

Public sector redistribution
from taxes
Public sector redistribution
from transfers

Social benefits efficiency
Constant

Number of Observations

O03 ***

-

(.001)
-

-

-

-

-

.173**
(.058)

R-squared
Adjusted R-square

-

Standard errors in parenthesis: * p < 0.05, ** p -

022
(.047)
28.96
(37.56)

040
(.031)

.160
O10
59

-.289
(.380)
-.287
(.380)

980
971
49

0.01,

*

328
253

p«

61

Sources: OECD.stat, LIS Data Bank, World Bank Group

While the “Tax System Structure” model accounts for 25.3% (adjusted) of the
variation in redistribution with the given group of independent variables, the “Tax
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System Size” model accounts for 97.1% (adjusted). Furthermore, the significant variables
include the total tax wedge, the overall tax burden, the social security contribution, and
capital formation. The relevance of capital formation is easy to understand — as more

state funds are invested in creating capital, fewer funds are able to go towards driving
redistribution (explaining the negative relationship between the two). The total tax wedge
is calculated as an average and thereby is an indicator of the size of the tax system for the
average worker. Both the tax burden and the social security contribution rate are
calculated as a percent of the GDP, irrespective of progressivity. It seems that what
matters in the redistribution of wealth is not the actual structure of the tax system but,
rather, the size of it.
Fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by the level of taxation, not by its
structure. Figures [V-3 and IV-4 demonstrate the relationship between fiscal
redistribution and tax revenues and direct tax progressivity, respectively, for several
OECD countries for the year 2000. Direct tax progressivity is measured by the Kakwani
Index — “a measure of the progressivity of the tax system that parses out the impact of
income concentration on the concentration of the tax burden” (Deng et al., 2009). Figure

IV-3 depicts a positive relationship between redistribution and the level of taxation,
measured by the overall tax burden as a percent of GDP. Contrarily, Figure [V-4 depicts
anegative association for the year 2000 between redistribution and tax progressivity.
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Transfers — including public social services (“in kind” transfers), social security,
and cash benefits — accounted for far more redistribution than did taxes. Transfers are

largely funded through taxation. Thus the larger the size of the tax burden, the greater the

impact of transfers, irrespective of the manner or structure through which tax revenues
are collected (Jesuit et al., 2008).
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Redistribution alone does not account for the level of inequality a country faces. It
does, however, account for the role the state takes in accounting for the level of
inequality. On average, fiscal redistribution accounted for between a 25%-30% change in
the level of inequality across OECD countries in 2011 (OECD, 2011). Ifa higher level of
taxation results in greater redistribution, and greater redistribution results in a higher
reduction of income inequality, then an inverse association can be concluded between
taxation and income inequality. I have empirically determined the existence of a negative
relationship between taxation and income inequality (via redistribution).

Implications
While progressivity and redistribution are often seen as interchangeable political
demands, the evidence demonstrates that this is not the case. For example, the
progressivity of the American tax system — one of the most progressive of OECD
countries — is of particular concern to right-wing American politicians, who claim the
system is already too progressive, especially in the face of leftist tendencies to push for
tax policy placing a greater burden on the rich in order to achieve higher levels of
redistribution (Sides, 2012). As it stands now the United State has among the lowest
levels of redistribution among OECD countries which, ultimately, corresponds to greater
inequality (OECD, 2011).
Political scientist Lucy Barnes challenges such sentiments in the US by refuting
claims that more progressivity will raise the level of redistribution and lower inequality
(Sides, 2012). Using empirical evidence, she demonstrates that the U.S. system of
taxation is, in fact, relatively progressive. A point of contention in the literature on
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comparative political economy, the American case exemplifies a negative relationship
between tax progressivity and overall redistribution. The politics of taxation remain
largely understudied in political science, which any state or public policy seeking to alter
the tax structure in any country ought to consider.

While this study cannot weigh in on what the “proper” role of the state in the
economy ought to be, it does demonstrate that a larger state presence brings about a more
equal society. Furthermore, it cannot confirm that more state intervention among those
who are more capable of paying (higher-income earners) plays any significant role in
altering inequality.

Limitations and future research
The difficulty I experienced in this study was the lack of comparable data, using
the same measurements and spanning across the same years, which would be credible and

relevant in a cross-regional study. I would have liked to incorporate third-world,
developing countries into the study to gauge whether the same conclusions could be
drawn, or whether the results I concluded only apply to OECD countries and others of a
similar development level. I cannot determine if my findings are universal in application
without further research on a broader scale.
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